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Resistant pathogens infections cause in healthcare set-
tings, higher patient mortality, longer hospitalisation 
times and higher costs for treatments. Strengthening 
and coordinating local, national and international sur-
veillance systems is the cornerstone for the control 
of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). In this study, the 
WHONET-SaTScan software was applied in a hospital 
in Italy to identify potential outbreaks of AMR. Data 
from San Filippo Neri Hospital in Rome between 2012 
and 2014 were extracted from the national surveil-
lance system for antimicrobial resistance (AR-ISS) and 
analysed using the simulated prospective analysis for 
real-time cluster detection included in the WHONET-
SaTScan software. Results were compared with the 
hospital infection prevention and control system. The 
WHONET-SaTScan identified 71 statistically significant 
clusters, some involving pathogens carrying multiple 
resistance phenotypes. Of these 71, three were also 
detected by the hospital system, while a further 15, 
detected by WHONET-SaTScan only, were considered 
of relevant importance and worth further investigation 
by the hospital infection control team. In this study, 
the WHONET-SaTScan system was applied for the 
first time to the surveillance of AMR in Italy as a tool 
to strengthen this surveillance to allow more timely 
intervention strategies both at local and national level, 
using data regularly collected by the Italian national 
surveillance system.
Introduction
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is considered a public 
health threat as it is increasingly hampering effective 
treatment of bacterial and fungal diseases worldwide 
[1,2]. According to the Global Report on Surveillance 
of Antimicrobial Resistance, rates of resistance are 
increasing in all World Health Organization (WHO) 
Regions in pathogens causing infections in both health-
care and community settings [3]. A better strategy to 
enhance surveillance and strengthen collaborations at 
a global level is needed in order to coordinate efficient 
control strategies and to complete the current gaps in 
surveillance caused by lack of standard methodologies 
for data collection and failure of data sharing at local, 
national and international levels [4].
Despite multiple efforts for harmonisation and cen-
tralisation of clinical data, lack of data standardisation 
and poor data accessibility still constitute a worldwide 
problem. There is also a current need for a standard-
ised interpretation of microbiology data as exempli-
fied by the recent breakpoint harmonisation process 
promoted by the European Committee on Antimicrobial 
Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) [5]. Clinical microbiol-
ogy reports represent an important resource for the 
detection of ongoing dissemination of resistant (and 
even susceptible) pathogens. In spite of this, they are 
often underutilised not only at local hospital level, but 
also in national surveillance systems or across coun-
tries [6].
With the aim to centralise and coordinate European 
surveillance of AMR, the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) coordinates the 
European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance 
Network (EARS-Net), a network of national surveil-
lance systems [7]. This network collects routine clini-
cal antimicrobial susceptibility data from 28 European 
Union (EU) and two European Economic Area (EEA) 
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countries (Norway and Iceland) concerning invasive 
isolates (blood and cerebrospinal fluid, CSF) of eight 
organisms considered of public health concern [8]. 
This network has promoted the regular collection of 
clinical data in the participating countries and further 
highlighted the need of a standardised data format. 
To address such a need, and to facilitate data shar-
ing, the WHO Collaborating Centre for Surveillance of 
Antimicrobial Resistance based at the Brigham and 
Women’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston 
(United States) developed a software to manage micro-
biology test results, the WHONET software [9], free 
to download, (www.whonet.org/software.html) that 
allows data entry into a standard format, or via BacLink 
utility software, a conversion tool [10]. Thanks to the 
software’s automated data entry and its ability to han-
dle large datasets as well as to rapidly generate trends 
and patterns, WHONET has become the official compo-
nent of many national surveillance programmes and is 
now used as a support tool in up to 120 WHO member 
states [11].
As a further application, WHONET has embedded 
the free SaTScan software (www.satscan.org) devel-
oped by Martin Kulldorff together with Information 
Management Services, Inc. and supported by various 
United States’ National Institutes of Health for the 
detection of spatial and temporal data clustering, using 
spatial, temporal or space-time scan statistics [12]. This 
algorithm is designed to evaluate random distribution 
or spatial and temporal clustering of diseases and to 
test their statistical significance, applied to surveil-
lance of diseases and their geographic/spatial deter-
minants or prospectively to timely detect outbreaks 
[13,14]. In combination, the WHONET-SaTScan system 
allows for timely detection of clusters of AMR patho-
gens in space and time facilitating outbreak investiga-
tions locally in a single hospital [15], in the community 
[16], or at national scale for real-time surveillance pur-
poses [17]. The system also enables to study transmis-
sion of resistance between wards [18].
In this study, the WHONET-SaTScan software was 
applied for the first time within the Italian surveillance 
system. Since 2001, Italy has in place a national antibi-
otic resistance surveillance project coordinated by the 
Istituto Superiore di Sanità (AR-ISS), based on sentinel 
microbiological laboratories, integrating more than 50 
hospitals throughout the country. Approximately 20 
laboratories have been part of a sub-network called 
MICRONET and until the end of 2014, automatically 
submitted clinical data every night to a central server 
[19]. MICRONET included clinical data for all bacte-
rial pathogens and all kind of samples. Furthermore, 
in Italy, the WHONET-BacLink software was already 
used at national level to aggregate and analyse data 
collected from all the laboratories belonging to the 
AR-ISS, making the Italian system ideal for the applica-
tion of the WHONET-SaTScan system. In this work, data 
collected retrospectively between 2012 and 2014 from 
one hospital in Rome were analysed using a simulated 
prospective method to detect statistically significant 
clusters of pathogens of public health importance. The 
alerts generated by this method were then compared 
with the ones generated by the detection method cur-
rently in place in the hospital to assess the validity of 
the WHONET-SaTScan for a possible future implemen-
tation within the surveillance of AMR in a real-time and 
predictive manner.
Methods
Setting of the study
San Filippo Neri Hospital (SFNH) is a public hospi-
tal, with predominant surgical activity, located in 
the northern urban area of Rome with a capacity of 
457 beds. Control and response to infections are 
responsibility of a hospital infections control team 
(Commissione Prevenzione e Controllo delle Infezioni 
Ospedaliere, CPCIO), composed of clinicians, microbi-
ologists and virologists, infection preventionists, phar-
macists and nurses. The CPCIO is coordinated by the 
hospital’s health manager, and collects microbiology 
data, detects epidemiological alerts and implements 
standardised control measures within the hospital. A 
procedure called ‘EpiD’ is activated when the definition 
of an outbreak is met (‘three or more samples of the 
same organism, isolated from three different patients 
within 5 days in the same operating unit’; ‘3 by 5’ rule) 
and containment measures are then set in place.
Figure 
Distribution of Acinetobacter baumannii XDR cases and 
cluster alerts, San Filippo Neri Hospital, Italy, January 
2013–May 2014
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XDR: extensive drug-resistant.
The figure shows number of cases per month and the empty bars 
represent the signals that generated the alert in 2013 by WHONET-
SaTScan; the sharp increase in number of cases in June 2013 
compared with the previous months is statistically significant (see 
Table 4). The cases in July and August are part of the same cluster, 
as detected by the SaTScan temporal window and possibly part of 
the same epidemiological cluster.
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Extraction of microbiology data and 
susceptibility test results 
Microbiology data were extracted from the MICRONET 
database, using date of test request as main param-
eter and setting restrictions to location (SFNH) and 
time (between January 2011 and the most recent data 
available at the time of the study, i.e. 30 May 2014). 
Data fields extracted included laboratory identity (ID), 
patient ID, sex, date of birth, age, pathogen type, 
ward, institution code, department, ward type, speci-
men number, specimen date, specimen type, specimen 
code, isolate number, admission date and susceptibil-
ity test results which were further described qualita-
tively as resistant (R), intermediate (I) and susceptible 
(S) based on minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) 
test results and assigned as per EUCAST breakpoints 
[20]. Data were then converted to WHONET compatible 
format using the BacLink software. During the conver-
sion the dataset was restricted to the first isolate per 
patient – including outpatients and inpatients admit-
ted to the hospital any time before specimen collection 
(i.e. with no distinction between hospital-acquired or 
community infections) – over a 365 days period and 
all R and I results were combined as ‘non susceptible’ 
(NS) for purposes of resistance phenotype analysis.
Resistance profiles were adapted to this setting by 
choosing a panel of antibiotics for the main groups 
of pathogens, according to SFNH’s frequency of per-
formed/reported antimicrobial tests per each group. 
The number of tests was obtained by performing a per 
cent resistant-intermediate-susceptible (%RIS) analysis 
on a sample of data from January to June 2013, assum-
ing consistency of testing protocols across years. A 
75% frequency was chosen as cut-off value.
Statistical analysis
The SaTScan cluster detection tool integrated into the 
WHONET software was used to retrospectively identify 
clusters of antimicrobial resistant pathogens in SFNH. 
SaTScan can identify clusters of cases in terms of spa-
tial only, temporal only, or combined spatial and tem-
poral distributions. In this work, we used the SaTScan 
space-time permutation scan statistics for the evalua-
tion of the statistical significance of identified clusters 
[14]. In this analysis, the temporal parameter was the 
‘specimen date’ while the spatial parameters included 
a specific location within the hospital, such as the 
actual ‘ward’ or a group of wards with communal care 
characteristic defined as ‘service’. Non-spatial vari-
ables were the ‘pathogen type’ or ‘resistance profile’ 
based on antibiotic susceptibility test results. Clusters 
were identified using the categorical variables ‘patho-
gen type’, ‘resistance profile’, ‘ward’ and ‘service’ plus 
a combination of such variables. The statistical sig-
nificance of clusters was evaluated by a Monte-Carlo 
maximum likelihood test using SatScan’s space-time 
permutation model. The parameters chosen for this 
analysis had been already assessed in previous stud-
ies [15,17]. A maximum cluster length of 60 days cut-off 
was chosen, corresponding to the maximum tempo-
ral scanning window size for signal generation. The 
statistical likelihood of signals is determined by the 
recurrence interval, which corresponds to the inverse 
of the p-value, expressed in days, signifying the time 
during which a similar signal would occur by random 
variation only. In this study, only clusters with a recur-
rence interval of > 365 days were included in the analy-
sis. The baseline parameter (i.e. the temporal baseline 
Table 1
Characteristics of isolates from San Filippo Neri Hospital 
extracted from MICRONET, Italy, January 2012–May 2014 
(n = 7,994 isolates)
Isolates characteristics Number of isolates Percentage
Year
2012 3,419 42.7
2013 3,327 41.7
2014a 1,248 15.6
Sex
Female 4,340 54.3
Male 3,616 45.2
Missing information 38 0.5
Specimen type
Urine 2,972 37.2
Pus 1,598 20.0
Blood 893 11.2
Tracheal aspirate 578 7.2
Vaginal swab 367 4.6
Cervical test 254 3.2
Sputum 238 3.0
Aspirateb 203 2.5
Nasal swab 168 2.1
Throat swab 161 2.0
Others 562 7.0
Organism group
Gram-negative 4,483 56.0
Gram-positive 2,984 37.3
Mycoplasma 272 3.4
Anaerobe 183 2.3
Fungi 57 0.7
Mycobacterium (non 
tuberculosis) 15 0.2
Department of origin
Outpatient 2,720 34.0
Medicine 1,970 24.6
Surgery 1,767 22.1
Intensive/intermediate 
care unit 1,108 13.8
Obstetric/gynaecology 160 2.0
Neonatology 121 1.5
Haematology/oncology 85 1.1
Emergency 49 0.6
Psychiatry 14 0.2
a Data are from the first 5 months of 2014 only.
b Aspirates other than tracheal aspirates.
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preceding the maximum temporal window against 
which is compared) was set to 365 days. Thus data from 
2011 were considered exclusively as baseline data (as 
they contributed to the first 365 days of the baseline) 
for the subsequent 2012 time period, and any clusters 
detected in 2011 were not included in the analysis.
Dataset generation and comparison of 
WHONET-SaTScan results with the SFNH 
infection prevention and control system 
Overlapping signals generated by the WHONET-SaTScan 
analysis were combined into a single ‘signal cluster’. In 
particular, clusters including more information (more 
types of signal at the same time), more epidemiologi-
cally relevant (in terms of duration, number of cases 
etc.) and with higher recurrence interval, were chosen 
as representative clusters provided by the system. 
Cluster summary and cluster detail tables were gener-
ated and line listings of all the isolates involved in the 
alerts were also produced. The summary table of the 
alerts compiled by WHONET-SaTScan was compared 
with the CPCIO official list of microbiology alerts from 
2012 to 2013 and an extract of the semester report of 
2014. Because the CPCIO’s analysis of the alert reports 
from previous years revealed that more than 75% of 
all episodes within the hospital were caused by three 
pathogens: Clostridium difficile, multidrug resistant 
(MDR) Acinetobacter baumannii and carbapenem-
resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae, the latest hospital 
reports, including the ones covered in our study, were 
restricted to such pathogens. Moreover, as C. difficile 
was not included in the SaTScan-WHONET list of organ-
isms at the time of this study, our comparison could 
only be based on A. baumannii and K. pneumoniae. 
A questionnaire, adapted from a Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital’s, was used to assess whether there were any 
clusters detected by the WHONET-SaTScan of epidemi-
ological or clinical importance. These alerts were fur-
ther classified according to the level of concern caused 
(1 – no concern, disregard; 2 – low concern, await more 
cases; 3 – moderate concern, action; 4 – high concern, 
action) and for moderate and high concern, on the type 
of action (1 – notify other members of the CPCIO to 
increase awareness; 2 – assess background frequency 
of organism; 3 – start investigating by assessing medi-
cal records to find a common source; 4– activate con-
tainment measures). The questionnaire was completed 
by the head of the microbiology and virology labora-
tory who was a member of the CPCIO at the time of this 
study.
Results
Dataset
The microbiology dataset from SFNH collected from the 
beginning of 2011 to the end of May 2014 included a 
total of 11,777 samples, of which 7,994 from 2012 and 
2014 were included in the final analysis, while 3,783 
from 2011 were used as baseline data only. Specimen 
types were mainly urine (37.2%), pus (20.0%), and 
blood (11.2%). Table 1 depicts a summary of isolates’ 
characteristics between 2012 and 2014. Overall, iso-
lates included 139 species, the most common being 
Escherichia coli (n = 2,092, 26.2%), Staphylococcus 
aureus (n = 742, 9.3%), Enterococcus faecalis (n = 656, 
8.2%), K. pneumoniae (n = 554, 6.9%) and Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa (n = 506, 6.3%).
Signals created by WHONET-SaTScan
The WHONET-SaTScan analysis generated a total of 
287 signals from 2012 to 2014 grouped into 90 ‘clus-
ter summaries’, among which some, overlapping in the 
spatial components of service/ward and resistance 
Table 2
Summary characteristics of clusters generated by 
WHONET-SatScan in San Filippo Neri Hospital, Italy, 
2012–2014 (n = 71 clusters)
Cluster characteristics Number Percentagea
Total number 71 100
Average number of clusters per 
month 4.5 NA
Year
2012 17         24.0
2013 42         59.1
2014 12         16.9
Pathogen type
Escherichia coli 18 25.4
Enterococcus faecalis 13 18.3
Klebsiella pneumoniae 7 9.9
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 5 7.0
Staphylococcus aureus 4 5.6
Acinetobacter baumannii 2 2.8
Other 22 31.0
Type of alerts
Ward and resistance profile 24 33.8
Resistance profile 21 29.5
Serviceb and resistance profile 16 22.5
Serviceb 4 5.7
Pathogen type 4 5.7
Ward 2 2.8
Mean number of signals per cluster 
(95% CI) 1.73 (1.53–1.93)
Number of cases
Total 700 100
Median per cluster (range) 4 (2–143)
Cluster length in days
1 10 14.1
2–5 17 24.0
6–10 10 14.1
11–50 21 29.5
> 50 13 18.3
CI: confidence interval; NA: not applicable.
a Unless otherwise specified in the row heading.
b A group of wards with communal care is defined as ‘service’.
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phenotype, were further merged manually into 71 final 
clusters. Table 2 shows the summary characteristics 
of the final 71 clusters. Of these: 18 were caused by 
E. coli strains mostly fully susceptible to all antibiot-
ics except for three, one of which being an extended-
spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) strain; 13 by E. 
faecalis with different combinations of resistance phe-
notypes; seven by K. pneumoniae, one of which with 
resistance to four different classes of antibiotics and 
one in the intensive care unit (ICU) caused by a car-
bapenem-resistant strain; four by P. aeruginosa, one in 
ICU by a possible extensive drug-resistant (XDR) strain; 
three by S. aureus, one being a meticillin-resistant S. 
aureus (MRSA) strain; two by A. baumannii, one of 
which involving 13 cases of an XDR organism over two 
months; lastly, two by Enterococcus faecium includ-
ing one by an MDR strain and the other including two 
cases of a vancomycin-resistant (VRE) strain in a neo-
natology ward.
Comparison of alerts generated by WHONET-
SaTScan with the hospital response system
In order to assess the validity of the method we com-
pared the signal alerts generated by our analysis with 
the ‘EpiD’ procedure activated by the CPCIO. The total 
number of potential outbreaks detected by the WHONET-
SaTScan system per year was higher than the number 
of activated ‘EpiD‘ (respectively, including C. difficile in 
‘EpiD’, 17 vs 4 in 2012, 42 vs 6 in 2013 and 12 vs 4 in 
2014). Table 3 summarises the comparison between the 
two systems, by year. In 2012, of two alerts detected by 
CPCIO (i.e. two activated ‘EpiD’), only the one involv-
ing K. pneumoniae is possibly in common between the 
two systems. However, this cluster was detected by 
WHONET-SaTScan in a different ward (outpatient) than 
by the CPCIO (which found the cluster in the ICU) and 
at a later time. As the CPCIO detected the K. pneumo-
niae cluster 11 days earlier, this outbreak was probably 
contained as result of the activation of the ‘Epid’ pro-
cedure. In 2013, three outbreaks were detected with 
a 100% agreement between the CPCIO and WHONET-
SaTScan; one of these outbreaks involved A. bauman-
nii in a cluster of long duration, which lasted from 20 
May 2013 to 1 August 2013 with a recurrence interval 
of 2 years. This large outbreak, however, included a 
smaller signal outbreak clustered by service and resist-
ance between 20 May 2013 and 25 June 2013 in the ICU 
with recurrence interval of 2.75 years (more rare) prob-
ably corresponding to the same signal that activated 
a response within the hospital. The signal of this clus-
ter as generated by the WHONET-SaTScan is shown in 
the Figure. The other two outbreaks were caused by 
K. pneumoniae and seem to have activated the ‘EpiD’ 
procedure only months after the start of the outbreak, 
according to WHONET-SaTScan. In 2014, there was 
no official report from the hospital at the time of the 
study, and the alerts we could obtain were only from 
Table 3
Comparison between Acinetobacter baumannii and Klebsiella pneumoniae alerts detected by San Filippo Neri’s CPCIO and 
WHONET-SaTScan systems, Italy, 2012–2014
Year Organism
Detected by the CPCIO Detected by WHONET-SaTScan Agreement 
between the two 
systems  
(%)
Number of 
alerts
Date of 
activation Ward
Number 
of casesa
Number of 
alerts
Start 
date Ward
Number of 
cases
2012
Acinetobacter 
baumannii 
MDR
1 14 Aug ICU ≥ 3 0 NA NA NA
50
Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
MDR
1 11 Sep ICU ≥ 3 1 22 Sep OUT 2
2013
Acinetobacter 
baumannii  
XDR
1 27 Jun ICU ≥ 3 1 20 May NSW 13
100
Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
MDR
1 11 Oct ICU ≥ 3 1 6 May ICU 6
Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
KPC
1 27 Nov ICU ≥ 3 1 3 Aug ICU 3
2014
Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
KPC 
1 Aprb ICU ND 0 NA NA NA NA
CPCIO: Commissione Prevenzione e Controllo delle Infezioni Ospedaliere (hospital infections control team); ICU: intensive care unit; 
KPC: Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenem-resistant; MDR: multidrug resistant; NA: not applicable; ND: no data; NSW: no specific ward; 
OUT:  outpatient ward; XDR: extensive drug-resistant.
a The number of cases detected by the CPCIO is at least three to trigger the activation of control response as per outbreak definition (see text 
for details).
b The exact date of activation was not available at the time of this study and only an unofficial report from 2014 was available.
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Table 4
Cluster alerts detected by WHONET-SaTScan in San Filippo Neri Hospital considered relevant by the hospital’s infection 
control system (CPCIO) and critical characteristics of the alerts for the evaluation, Italy, 2012–2014 (n = 18 alerts)
Organisma Type of alert
Alert 
characteristicsb
Dates of outbreak 
(start–end)
Recurrence interval 
(1/n years)
Observed 
cases
Observed/ 
expected 
case ratio
Time span 
in days
CPCIO 
evaluation
2012
E. coli Ward/res Gen med Fully susceptible 5 Sep–22 Sep 1/1.14 18 2.51 19 Pat/res
P. 
aeruginosa Ward/res
Vascular surgery 
CTX, SXT 12 Oct–22 Oct 1/1.25 4 7.02 11 Pat/res
E. aerogenes Ward/res Vascular surgery Fully susceptible 22 Oct–25 Oct 1/19.85 2 6.06 4 Ward
S. 
marcescens Res SXT 13 Nov–15 Nov 1/22.40 2 5.56 3 Pat/res
2013
E. coli Ward/res Neuro-rehab 20 Apr–20 Apr 1/1.52 2 153.85 1 Ward
K. 
pneumoniae Res
CTX, CAZ, CIP, 
GEN, TZP, SXT 6 May–6 Jun 1/23.69 6 46.15 32 Pat/res
E. faecium Serv/res
Neonatology 
AMP, ERY, GEN, 
IPM, LVX, MFX, 
VAN
10 Jun–12 Jun 1/1.30 2 21.05 3 Pat/res/serv
S. aureus Res LVX, OXA, PEN 26 Apr–22 Jun 1/1.44 10 4.13 58 Pat/res
P. 
aeruginosa Ward/res
ICU 
CTX, CAZ, IPM, 
MEM, TZP, SXT
15 Jun–1 Jul 1/1.44 3 23.08 17 Pat/res/ward
S. 
marcescens Serv/res
ICU 
AMK 19 May–15 Jul 1/2.11 3 4.76 58 Pat/res/serv
A. baumannii Res
CTX, CAZ, CIP, 
GEN, IPM, MEM, 
SXT
20 May–1 Aug 1/2.00 13 3.56 74 Pat/res
K. 
pneumoniae Serv/res
ICU 
AMK, CTX, CAZ, 
CIP, GEN, IPM, 
MEM, TZP, SXT
3 Aug–7 Aug 1/2.78 3 38.96 5 Pat/res/serv
P. 
aeruginosa Serv Interm care unit 26 Aug–27 Sep 1/4.13 4 9.52 33 Serv
K. 
pneumoniae Serv Interm care unit 5 Oct–18 Oct 1/1.25 3 15.79 14 Serv
S. aureus Ward/res Ortho-Trauma Fully susceptible 2 Dec–2 Dec 1/2.11 2 142.86 1
Pat/res/
ward
S. 
marcescens Serv/res
Gen Med 
AMK 24 Dec–3 Jan 2014 1/1.37 2 9.09 11 Pat/res/serv
2014
P. 
aeruginosa Serv/res
Surgery 
CIP, IPM, SXT 31 Mar–31 Mar 1/2.49 2 105.26 1 Pat/res/serv
S. maltophila Ward/res ICU 14 Apr–28 May 1/3.26 2 4.35 45 Pat/res/ward
Gen med: general medicine; ICU: intensive care unit; interm care unit: intermediate care unit; neuro-rehab: neuro-rehabilitation; ortho-trauma: 
orthopaedic trauma; pat: pathogen type; res: resistance; serv: service.
a The organisms are abbreviated as follows: A. baumannii: Acinetobacter baumannii; E. aerogenes: Enterobacter aerogenes; E. coli: Escherichia 
coli; E. faecium: Enterococcus faecium; K. pneumoniae: Klebsiella pneumoniae; P. aeruginosa: Pseudomonas aeruginosa; S. aureus: 
Staphylococcus aureus; S. maltophila: Stenotrophomonas maltophila; S. marcescens: Serratia marcescens.
b Antibiotics listed in this column are abbreviated as follows: AMK: amikacin; AMP: ampicillin; CAZ: ceftazidime; CIP: ciprofloxacin; 
CTX: cefotaxime; ERY: erythromycin; GEN: gentamicin; IPM: imipenem; LVX: levofloxacin; MEM: meropenem; MFX: moxifloxacin; 
OXA: oxacillin; PEN: penicillin; SXT: trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole; TZP: tazobactam; VAN: vancomycin.
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incomplete reports. However, none of the CPCIO alerts 
was detected by WHONET-SaTScan.
Evaluation of the alerts generated by 
WHONET-SaTScan
To assess the benefit of WHONET-SaTScan we asked a 
member of the CPCIO to evaluate the alerts generated 
by this system. Table 4 shows the alerts considered 
worth knowing by the hospital and by type of crucial 
characteristic (pathogen type, resistance phenotype or 
location). Of the 71 clusters detected by the WHONET-
SaTScan analysis, 18 were considered of importance, 
of which only three had been initially detected by the 
CPCIO. The majority of these clusters were deemed 
relevant for the hospital because of the combined 
characteristics of pathogen type, resistance pheno-
type and location (n = 8, 44%), but also for their loca-
tion alone (n = 4, 22%). Of these 18 clusters, including 
the ones detected by the CPCIO, six were considered 
of low concern, eight of moderate concern and four of 
high concern. For the eight alerts of moderate concern 
only two of the four types of possible actions were acti-
vated (i.e. 1 – notification of other members of CPCIO 
and 4 – start response measures), while the four alerts 
of high concern would trigger all four types of action. 
Among the high concern alerts, one caused by an E. 
faecium VRE strain in June 2013 and one by a P. aerugi-
nosa MDR/XDR strain in July 2013, occurred completely 
undetected by the CPCIO.
Discussion
Timeliness is one of the main attributes of a good 
surveillance system, representing the ability to take 
appropriate public health action based on urgency 
[21]. Electronic data systems for the collection and 
analysis of microbiology data are becoming essential 
tools for surveillance to guarantee reliability, timeli-
ness and standardisation across different compart-
ments [22]. The aim of this work is to show the utility 
of a new tool, the WHONET-SaTScan, for surveillance 
of AMR in healthcare settings, especially in a context 
in which national surveillance programmes facilitate 
automated routine data collection, as the case of the 
Italian MICRONET [23].
When compared with traditional surveillance methods, 
the automated system used in this study showed a dis-
crepancy in detected signals, as previously observed in 
other studies [15,24]. The higher number of signals pro-
duced by WHONET-SaTScan could be due to methodo-
logical differences compared to the CPCIO approach. 
WHONET-SaTScan generates a list of statistically sig-
nificant signals, using an arbitrary choice for the cut-
off value of significance (the recurrence interval), that 
affects sensitivity and specificity of the method, there-
fore meaning that statistically significant signals could 
not be necessarily indicative of a real outbreak or vice 
versa. Furthermore, the space-time permutation statis-
tics cannot distinguish underlying fluctuations of local 
population sizes or temporal variations of detection 
frequency, leading to biased p-values [14]. In contrast, 
the CPCIO’s method is based on the classic definition 
of outbreak based on the ‘3 by 5’ rule, irrespective of 
the baseline incidence of the organism or the specific 
resistance phenotypes. In this case, its sensitivity is 
determined by the complexity of the case definition 
and personal interpretation, particularly in case of com-
plex resistance phenotypes, while its specificity can 
be affected by baseline incidence. As a consequence, 
detection of clusters could be either delayed or even 
missing, especially if cases are spread throughout the 
hospital or, alternatively, infection control responses 
could be triggered when not needed, drawing staff and 
resources from the hospital and causing unnecessary 
distress to patients. On the other hand, traditional 
methods allow case-by-case interpretations based on 
personal experience and hospital background, iden-
tifying clusters not statistically but epidemiologically 
significant, like for example the cluster of A. bauman-
nii in 2012, detected only by the CPCIO. Lack of infor-
mation on the evolution of outbreaks after activation 
of the ‘EpiD’ procedure in the CPCIO reports, besides 
providing no indication on the efficacy of the meas-
ures adopted, interferes with the comparison between 
extent of outbreaks, as clusters detected by WHONET-
SaTScan may result in higher case numbers and longer 
time spans.
The WHONET-SaTScan system showed some advan-
tages compared to the CPCIO’s. The ‘3 by 5’ rule applied 
to a single ward at the time, in particular to critical 
care units, seems to be restrictive when compared 
with the WHONET-SaTScan ability to include groups of 
wards together or cover the whole hospital simultane-
ously. In this study, the ‘EpiD’ activated by the CPCIO 
occurred mainly in the ICU, while the clusters detected 
by WHONET-SaTScan were more homogeneously dis-
tributed throughout the hospital. The evaluation by 
the CPCIO coordinator showed that the main factor to 
trigger a response was the organism resistance pro-
file, followed by pathogen type, location and source 
of specimen. The WHONET-SaTScan analysis allows 
for the investigation of clusters according to a specific 
resistance profile in combination to a specific location 
(‘resistance/ward’ and ‘resistance/service’), useful 
when an outbreak is occurring in a critical care ward. 
In addition, within the same analysis WHONET-SaTScan 
identifies clusters of susceptible strains, otherwise 
neglected due to a higher focus on resistance. Such 
clusters could be, in fact, of great interest to the infec-
tion control team for their routes of transmission and to 
the medical team in terms of pathogen characteristics 
and for offering different therapeutic options.
This study is not exempt of limitations and bias. Its 
retrospective nature undermines the efficacy of the 
WHONET-SaTScan system in the ‘field’. If conducted 
in real-time, it would have detected two clusters of 
MDR K. pneumoniae on average 126 days (95% con-
fidence interval (CI): 66–186; n = 2), i.e. four months 
earlier, than the standard hospital control system, 
plus additional ones (two outbreaks of E. faecium VRE 
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strain and P. aeruginosa MDR/XDR) that had occurred 
unnoticed within the hospital. The possibility to inves-
tigate prospectively the list of statistically significant 
alerts in combination with the clinical and epidemio-
logical expertise of the hospital control team would 
provide a better evaluation of its benefits. Moreover, 
the inclusion of C. difficile, at the time not included in 
the list of organisms in the WHONET-SatScan analysis, 
would have better met the needs of the facility under 
investigation.
Reporting bias occurs as a consequence of selective 
reporting and control within the hospital due to a com-
bination of resource availability, therapeutic choices 
and background prevalence data. For example, because 
of the endemic distribution in Italy of MRSA or ESBLs 
and the lack of appropriate resources for a prompt and 
effective intervention, the hospital adopted the policy 
of not reporting alerts triggered by these organisms. 
Again, the choice of antibiotics routinely used would 
reflect the panel of antibiotics tested and included in 
the configuration of WHONET, thus generating a list 
of alerts biased by the hospital policy on testing and 
reporting microbiology data. Lack of representative-
ness is another limitation of this study, as SFNH has 
in place an official procedure for infection control and 
a regular collection of standardised microbiology data, 
which most likely does not reflect the situation of other 
hospitals in Italy, a country with high between-hospital 
and regional variation.
Nevertheless, this work represents the first applica-
tion of the WHONET-SaTScan system in a healthcare 
facility in Italy with the potential to be applied to other 
hospitals, extended to multiple hospitals in the same 
area or region or even on a larger scale to the whole 
national territory. Although the WHONET software is 
implemented within the surveillance systems of other 
European countries [25-27], this pilot study represents 
the first example of its application to the detection of 
clusters of resistant pathogens within a national sur-
veillance system in Europe.
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